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Abstract
Following a period of rapid financial liberalization and a record credit boom in the 1980s,
Sweden’s financial system suffered its worst shock in the post–World War II period. Swedish
banks were heavily dependent on foreign credit, which dried up amid signs of instability.
The Swedish government announced a blanket guarantee on September 24, 1992, for all
banks’ obligations except share capital and perpetual subordinated loans. According to a
1995 IMF Working Paper by Drees and Pazarbasioglu, the purpose of the blanket guarantee
was “to guarantee the stability of the payments system and to safeguard the general supply
of credit.” The blanket guarantee gave the Riksbank the option to lend to any commercial
bank operating in Sweden, even to those that were on the brink of insolvency, and to extend
emergency liquidity assistance to troubled banks without imposing collateral requirements.
The government created the Bank Support Authority to administer the guarantee and other
measures. The balance sheets of Sweden’s banks totaled 1.5 trillion Swedish krona (SEK;
USD 270 billion) in 1991, approximately 100% of GDP. The blanket guarantee was never
exercised and was replaced by standing deposit insurance on July 1, 1996, with a coverage
limit of SEK 250,000. The government guaranteed only depositors, and no other bank
creditors, after the blanket guarantee was replaced.
Keywords: banking crisis, bank resolution, blanket guarantee, Nordic Financial Crisis,
Sweden

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering blanket guarantee programs. Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at
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Overview
Following a period of deregulation in the
mid-1980s, Sweden’s financial sector
experienced a period of increased credit
growth until 1990 (Riksdag 1994). The
sharp rise in risky lending and the brewing
currency crisis were accompanied by signs
the real economy was overheating.

Key Terms
Purpose: To “guarantee the stability of the
payments system and to safeguard the general
supply of credit” (Drees and Pazarbasioglu 1995,
43). The guarantee also allowed the Riksbank to
provide banks with liquid assets in domestic or
foreign currency so they could unquestionably
meet their commitments

During the early 1990s, economic growth Launch Date(s)
Announcement: Sept. 24, 1992
Authorization: Dec. 18, 1992
started to slow down, and credit losses
gradually increased over 1990–1992. Loan
July 1, 1996
losses peaked in 1992 at nearly 80 billion End Date(s)
Swedish krona (SEK; USD 14.3 billion),3 or
Eligible
All banks with a Swedish
7.5% of total loans, while the banking Institutions
charter (including their
sector recorded an operating loss of almost
subsidiaries), foreign-owned
SEK 50 billion (MoF 1995). The banking
subsidiaries located in
Sweden, and certain other
crisis started with nonbank financial
credit institutions with a state
companies.4 Nyckeln, a finance company,
affiliation
announced large losses on real estate loans
in August and September 1990. Its Eligible Liabilities All obligations except share
September 24 announcement triggered a
capital and perpetual
subordinated loans
market run on finance companies’
investment certificates (Jennergren 2011).
None
Investment certificates (marknadsbevis) Fees
were a form of short-term borrowing, like
Coverage
SEK 1.5 trillion
commercial paper, which were then a
(USD 270 billion)
significant source of funding for finance
companies—typically
backed
by Outcomes
The guarantee was not used.
guarantees that banks provided. Nyckeln
However, the Riksbank utilized
the guarantee to deposit
and two other finance companies defaulted
SEK 56 billion of its foreign
during the fall of 1990 (Englund 2015). The
reserves in Swedish banks
Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the central
bank, Sveriges Riksbank, assessed that the Notable Features
Flexibility provided to
finance company crisis was not systemic.
Riksbank to offer ELA and
uncollateralized loans, broad
However, an MoF review led to a change in
political support, broad
the law that allowed finance companies to
coverage, and open-ended
finance through certificates and bonds
funding
(Ingves and Lind 1998). Bank lending to
finance companies such as Nyckeln
comprised only 4% of total bank lending, and the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority
Per Bloomberg, USD 1 = SEK 5.56 on December 31, 1991.
Nonbank financial companies primarily engaged in activities such as leasing, factoring, providing installment
loans, and offering credit cards but gradually expanded into other forms of lending.
3
4
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(FSA; Finansinspektionen) persuaded banks to increase their funding to finance companies
(Urwitz 1998).
As real estate prices started to fall in 1990, the seven largest banks, with a market share of
90%, suffered heavy losses, primarily from loans in the commercial real estate sector
(Lundgren 2009, 1). Between 1990 and 1992, bank credit losses increased from 0.2% to
7.5% of the total loan stock. In April 1992, Gota Bank, the fourth-largest bank in Sweden,
experienced a minor bank run as SEK 2 billion, or 5% of its deposits, was withdrawn in a
week, sparked by an announcement by its parent company that it was unwilling and unable
to further support the bank (Urwitz 1998). On September 9, 1992, the government
announced a general guarantee for Gota’s obligations, including all forms of bank debt and
deposits and excluding only equity. On September 16, 1992, Gota AB, the holding company
of Gota Bank, suspended payments on its liabilities and the government restated its
guarantee of Gota Bank’s obligations (Webb 1992).5 A week after the Gota Bank guarantee,
on September 17, as the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM)6 crisis was unfolding,
the krona came under heavy speculative pressure, and the Riksbank raised the overnight
rate to 500% to defend the krona and stem capital outflows that reached a record SEK 59
billion (USD 9.8 billion) in the week ended September 21 (Englund 2015; WSJ 1992).
On September 24, 1992, the government announced the blanket guarantee to “guarantee the
stability of the payments system and to safeguard the general supply of credit” (Drees and
Pazarbasioglu 1995, 43). The government deemed the measure necessary to address the
reduced access to foreign currency funding.
The Swedish Parliament, the Riksdag, passed a bill on December 18, 1992, that authorized
the guarantee and created the Bank Support Authority (BSA; Bankstödsnämnden) to
administer it. The Riksdag stated that all banks with a Swedish charter (including their
subsidiaries) and foreign-owned subsidiaries located in Sweden were eligible for the blanket
guarantee. Share capital and perpetual subordinated loans were excluded from coverage.
The liabilities covered by the blanket guarantee represented approximately 100% of GDP in
1991, totaling SEK 1.5 trillion (Riksbank 2011). The guarantee was provided free of charge
(Edmonds 2015). The bill authorizing the guarantee did not identify an end date and stated
that the support system must remain in place as long as needed to protect creditors
(Measures to Support 1992). The blanket guarantee was never used and was replaced by
Sweden’s first standing deposit insurance scheme on July 1, 1996, which did not cover senior
debt and other nondeposit liabilities (Englund 2015).
Summary Evaluation
The conventional view of Sweden’s banking crisis is that the government “did many things
wrong in the process leading up to the crisis but many things right in resolving it” (Englund
The government formally acquired Gota Bank for 1 krona through the state-owned Nordbanken in December
1992 (Borio, Vale, and von Peter 2010, 34; Englund 2015, 21–22).
6 Misalignment of several currencies in the ERM, the outcome of the Danish European Union referendum, and
withdrawal of the United Kingdom and Italy from the ERM led to the crisis. For a detailed explanation of the
ERM crisis, refer to Higgins (1993).
5
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2015, 37). The Swedish government is largely recognized for providing a timely intervention,
lending strong credibility to the blanket guarantee through political unity and strong
government finances, providing comprehensive coverage, limiting moral hazard, and issuing
a competitively neutral policy (Edmonds 2015). Notably, Sweden did not have an
administrative authority to deal with systemic crises or a standing deposit insurance scheme
when the government announced the blanket guarantee, so it was unclear how the guarantee
would operate. Nonetheless, the market viewed the guarantee as credible because it had
broad political support and strong government finances backing it, as the government deficit
as a percent of GDP was lower than the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development country average (Garcia 2000).
The “Swedish model” for crisis resolution is sometimes hailed as a model for other countries
(Englund 2015, 50). However, Englund points out that the success of the blanket guarantee
and other support measures was largely dependent on the decision to abandon the fixed
exchange rate system, the improving world economy, and the ability of private banks to
recapitalize themselves. Since no banks covered by the guarantee failed, there was no need
to exercise the blanket guarantee.
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Key Design Decisions
1. Purpose: The Swedish government, in cooperation with the opposition,
announced the blanket guarantee to “guarantee the stability of the payments
system and to safeguard the general supply of credit.”
On September 24, 1992, the Swedish government, in cooperation with the opposition, issued
a press release outlining measures it expected to formalize later that year to address the
financial crisis. The press release stated that the government would honor the obligations of
Swedish banks and their subsidiaries, and credit institutions outside the banking sector that
had a government affiliation. It noted that the purpose of the blanket guarantee was to
ensure that households, enterprises, and other holders of claims felt safe (MoF 1992). The
Riksdag approved a bill in December 1992 that authorized the guaranteed (Measures to
Support 1992).
The blanket guarantee enabled the Riksbank to lend to commercial banks operating in
Sweden, regardless of solvency, and to extend emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) to
troubled banks without imposing collateral requirements (Borio, Vale, and von Peter 2010;
Lundgren 2009).
Additionally, Jonung (2009a) notes that short-term foreign borrowing represented about
40% of total bank borrowing, and the krona was under heavy speculative pressure. The
combination of Swedish banks’ significant dependence on foreign financing and currency
pressures prompted policy makers to issue a blanket guarantee to alleviate fears abroad that
Swedish commercial banks would not be able to meet their foreign obligations (Lundgren
2009). The guarantee was successful in the sense that foreigners’ confidence in the solvency
of Swedish commercial banks remained intact (Jonung 2009b). The krona was left free to
float on November 19, 1992, following which the Swedish economy recovered rapidly and
bank losses were limited; thus, banks did not require much further support once the
guarantee was in place (Englund 2015).
2. Part of a Package: The MoF provided support to three banks on an ad hoc basis
before the announcement of the blanket guarantee, with capital injections,
specific guarantees, and loan subsidies.
Before the blanket guarantee announcement, the government supported three banks on an
ad hoc basis. In October 1991, Första Sparbanken and Nordbanken were supported through
a specific guarantee, subsidized loans, and capital injections (Borio, Vale, and von Peter
2010). On September 9, 1992, the government announced a guarantee for all of Gota Bank’s
obligations, excluding only equity. Two weeks later, it became clear that the crisis was
systemic and all banks were facing a funding problem, so the government expanded the Gota
guarantee to a blanket guarantee for all creditors in Swedish banks (Englund 2015).
Along with the announcement of the blanket guarantee on September 24, 1992, the
government stated that it might undertake other support measures including, “guarantees,
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loans and supply of capital, or to take other measures to increase or strengthen the capital
base of banks and of credit institutions with Government affiliation” (MoF 1995).
Bo Lundgren, the minister for fiscal and financial affairs during the crisis, later said that the
blanket guarantee was the “cornerstone” of the package of measures the government
implemented in 1992 to address the banking crisis (2009, 2). He said that the government’s
guarantee enabled the Riksbank to take other measures to further assist Swedish banks. For
example, the Riksbank was able to make deposits in domestic and foreign currencies and
extend ELA to troubled banks without imposing collateral requirements, since the
government had already assumed responsibility for the banks’ obligations through the
blanket guarantee. To assist Swedish banks whose foreign lenders had pulled out of Sweden,
the Riksbank deposited SEK 56 billion of its foreign reserves in Swedish banks (Borio, Vale,
and von Peter 2010). Lundgren (2009) finds that the blanket guarantee also allowed banks
to resume funding in interbank markets.
The government injected capital into Nordbanken and Gota Bank, which nationalized the
two banks; provided funding for the bad bank asset management companies Securum and
Retriva; provided a capital adequacy guarantee to Föreningsbanken in 1994; and provided
loans to Sparbanksstiftelsen between 1991 and 1992(Borio, Vale, and von Peter 2010). Of
the seven major banks, all but Handelsbanken entered discussions with the BSA to receive
some support apart from the blanket guarantee (Englund 2015). Figure 1 in the Appendix
provides a table detailing all bank support measures undertaken by the state during the
crisis.
3. Legal Authority: The Riksdag passed a bill on December 18, 1992, that approved
the blanket guarantee, and an additional bill on June 10, 1993, that established an
Appeal Board for Bank Support Issues.
The Riksdag passed a bill on December 18, 1992, that announced measures to strengthen
the financial system, approved the blanket guarantee, and established a Bank Support
Authority to oversee the crisis resolution (Riksdag 1994). On June 10, 1993, the Riksdag
passed an additional bill that established an Appeal Board for Bank Support Issues (State Aid
to Banks 1993).
The day of the announcement of the guarantee in September 1992, the fiscal and financial
affairs minister, Bo Lundgren, told the press that the guarantee had the support of the
opposition Social Democrats, ensuring its approval in the Riksdag (Mikkelsen 1992).
Markets found that commitment sufficient in the ensuing months before the Riksdag made
its formal decision.
4. Administration: The BSA administered the blanket guarantee.
Along with the authorization of the blanket guarantee on December 18, 1992, the
government created the BSA to administer all support to banks and other credit institutions.7
7

Before the issuance of the blanket guarantee, the MoF handled bank support.
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The BSA designed support programs, and banks applied to the BSA for government support.
The BSA evaluated and disbursed funds to institutions seeking support based on a thorough
analysis of a bank’s nonperforming loans and long-term earning potential (Drees and
Pazarbasioglu 1995). Those institutions that received funds were required to report their
financial statements, including incurred and expected credit losses, collateral values, and
other significant balance sheet information, to the BSA (Ingves and Lind 1998). The BSA
monitored support recipients and collected repayments.8 Only the Riksdag, with the passing
of a new bill, could end the blanket guarantee (Measures to Support 1992).
The BSA also hired consultants from Arthur Andersen, McKinsey, and Credit Suisse First
Boston to analyze banks’ internal control systems, strategies, efficiency, and finances (Ingves
and Lind 1998).
5. Governance: The BSA was subject to audit by the National Audit Office and was
required to submit regular reports to the Riksdag.
The BSA formally began its operations in May 1993, with a staff consisting of a governmentappointed board of seven members, including a director general and deputy director general.
In implementing and managing support programs, the BSA was responsible for consulting
with and providing information on support measures to the Riksbank, FSA, the National Debt
Office, and the Swedish Competition Authority on matters that concerned those institutions,
with the MoF arbitrating rare disagreements between these agencies (Ingves and Lind
2008).
As a government entity, the BSA was subject to audit by the National Audit Office (MoF 1993).
The BSA was required to submit decisions of principal importance to the government for
approval (Measures to Support 1992). The BSA was also required to report measures taken
frequently and provide an annual report on the budgetary consequences of support
measures to the Riksdag (Riksdag 1994).9
In 1993, the Riksdag established an Appeal Board for Bank Support Issues to ensure that
support agreements were consistent with the state’s interest and to establish an appeals
process in cases where the state and the institution in question could not reach an
agreement, provided the institution would be insolvent without state support. The act that
created the Appeal Board for Bank Support Issues also established that the state could
redeem shares of an institution if an agreement assessed by the Appeal Board was not
accepted, an essential commitment of an agreement was ignored by an institution, or the
capital base of an institution fell below 2% of assets (State Aid to Banks 1993).

Further, the BSA was responsible for managing shares acquired as a result of share capital contribution
support or restructuring and for liquidating these shares when it was commercially appropriate.
9 These reports were submitted in May 1993, September 1993, and in the 1993–1994 budget bill.
8
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6. Communication: The Swedish government issued a press release on September
24, 1992, stating that the blanket guarantee was to ensure that “households,
enterprises and other holders of claims can feel safe.”
When the blanket guarantee was announced on September 24, 1992, no details were given
about support measures or the BSA. Regardless, the guarantee succeeded in securing
continued international funding because it had broad political support and provided broad
coverage (Englund 2015).
To increase government credibility, the activities of the BSA were made as transparent as
possible, with exceptions for trade secrets of aid recipients (Measures to Support 1992).
Further, the main political opposition, the Social Democratic party, was given complete
insight into the BSA’s activities and was also represented on the BSA’s board (Ingves and
Lind 1996).
7. Source(s) and Size of Funding: The government provided the BSA with unlimited
funding.
The blanket guarantee covered the balance sheets of Sweden’s banks, which were
approximately 100% of GDP in 1991, representing SEK 1.5 trillion (Riksbank 2011).
The Riksdag provided the BSA with open-ended funding and did not set a predetermined
budget, to avoid the risk of the BSA being forced to go back to the Riksdag to ask for
additional funding at a later stage (Jonung 2009b).10
8. Eligible Institutions: All banks with a Swedish charter, including domestic
subsidiaries and foreign-owned subsidiaries located in Sweden, and certain stateaffiliated credit institutions were eligible for support.
All banks with a Swedish charter (including their subsidiaries) and foreign-owned
subsidiaries located in Sweden were eligible for the blanket guarantee (Measures to Support
1992). In addition to these banks, the legislation authorizing the blanket guarantee identified
eight specific credit institutions11 with a state affiliation that were deemed eligible to receive
support because they were integral to the stability of the payment system (Drees and
Pazarbasioglu 1995). The central bank considered these credit institutions to have systemic
importance since several were important in specialized fields, such as providing export
credits to farmers.

The Finnish experience of setting a limit to bank support and subsequently revising the limit at considerable
political cost served as a warning for the Swedish Parliament.
11 The credit institutions covered by the guarantee were the Kingdom of Sweden’s City Mortgage Fund, Sveriges
Allmänna Hypoteksbank, Svenska skeppshypotekskassan, Statens Bostadsfinansieringsaktiebolag, SBAB, AB
Svensk Exportkredit, AB Industrikredit, and Lantbrukskredit AB.
10
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9. Eligible Liabilities: All obligations were covered except share capital and
perpetual subordinated loans.
All obligations were covered except share capital and perpetual subordinated loans (Riksdag
1992).
10. Fees: There were no fees associated with the blanket guarantee.
The BSA provided the blanket guarantee free of charge (Edmonds 2015).
11. Process for Exercising Guarantee: The process associated with exercising the
guarantee is not clear.
Research did not reveal the process for exercising the guarantee.
12. Other Restrictions: The blanket guarantee did not have specific restrictions
related to it.
It does not appear that the blanket guarantee had specific restrictions related to it.
Restrictions associated with other forms of bank support included: restrictions on dividend
payments, management replacement, setting recapitalization targets, implementation of
cost-cutting measures, and forced write-downs of shareholder equity (Borio, Vale, and von
Peter 2010).
13. Duration: The Swedish government authorized the blanket guarantee on
December 18, 1992, and replaced it with a limited deposit insurance system on
July 1, 1996.
The bill establishing the blanket guarantee did not identify an end date and stated that the
support system must remain in place as long as needed to ensure the interests of creditors
were not jeopardized (Measures to Support 1992). An MoF memorandum in November 1995
proposed that the state terminate the blanket guarantee from July 1, 1996 (MoF 1995). This
recommendation was based on a FSA assessment of the 114 banks covered by the guarantee
that found that the banking system had recovered, and the program was terminated as
proposed in the MoF memorandum (Ingves and Lind 1996). The blanket guarantee was
replaced by standing deposit insurance on July 1, 1996, with a coverage limit of SEK 250,000
(Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2008; Garcia 2000).
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Appendix
Figure 1: Overview of Bank Support Measures Taken by Sweden 1991–1993

Source: MoF 1995.
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